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Governmentality and the reflection of legal educators : assessment 
practices as a case study 
Matthew Ball 
Abstract 
This paper presents a conceptual framework, informed by Foucault's work on 
governmentality, which allows for new kinds of reflection on the practice of legal education. 
Put simply, this framework suggests that legal education can be understood as a form of 
government that relies on a specific rationalisation and programming of the activities of 
legal educators, students, and administrators, and is implemented by harnessing specific 
techniques and bodies of “know-how”. Applying this framework to assessment at three 
Australian law schools, this paper highlights how assessment practices are rationalised, 
programmed, and implemented, and points out how this government shapes students' legal 
personae. In particular, this analysis focuses on the governmental effects of pedagogical 
discourses that are dominant within the design and scholarship of legal education. It 
demonstrates that the development of pedagogically-sound regimes of assessment has 
contributed to a reformulation of the terrain of government, by providing the conditions 
under which forms of legal personae may be more effectively shaped, and extending the 
power relations that achieve this. This analysis provides legal educators with an original way 
of reflecting on the power effects of teaching the law, and new opportunities for thinking 
about what is possible in legal education. 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the scholarship of teaching and learning has come to play an 
increasing role in the design and delivery of the university legal curriculum, and the 
professional reflection of legal educators. One strong focus of these moves has been 
assessment practices. Recent shifts in assessment – away from primarily closed-book 
examinations towards reflections, essays, tutorial participation, and the alignment of 
assessment with intended learning outcomes – have been informed by these pedagogical 
discourses, and presented as a progression towards objectively more effective and 
appropriate learning environments for students. 2 Pedagogical discourses are positioned as 
“true” and thought of as quasi-scientific, and thus assessment practices based on them are 
understood to provide the most ethical and appropriate way to positively contribute to a 
student's personal development, and remove them from the perceived negative learning 
environments produced by law schools. 3  
While pedagogy has become a dominant discourse within legal education and is 
subsequently relied on by legal educators seeking to ethically reflect on their professional 
practice, the unacknowledged power effects of these pedagogical knowledges and practices 
are rarely considered. As Michel Foucault argues, “[p]eople know what they do; they 
frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do 
does 4 ”. This paper seeks to add a new explicitly critical and ethical dimension to the 
reflection undertaken by legal educators. It presents a framework based on Foucault's work 
on governmentality, which is concerned with the way government is carried out and 
thought about, 5 that allows them to reflect on some of the power effects of legal 
education, and to more clearly grasp “what what they do does”. It will use assessment 
practices as an example of how this framework can be applied. Based on this analysis, this 
paper will argue that assessment practices informed by pedagogical knowledges are not 
inherently better than other forms of assessment. Rather, they can be understood as simply 
reformulating the terrain of government by specifically providing the conditions under 
which forms of legal personae can be shaped, and extending the power relations that allows 
this to occur. While it does not focus on the particular kinds of legal personae that are 
produced by each specific practice, this paper highlights how these practices provide the 
conditions of possibility that allow these personae to be produced. Clearly, this argument 
problematises the lauding of such pedagogically-sound regimes of assessment, and 
demonstrates that power relations do not cease to exist in the context of assessment simply 
because these practices are based on knowledge that claims legitimacy by virtue of its 
“truth”. 6  
Ethical reflection using governmentality 
The concept of governmentality that underpins the framework presented here provides a 
unique way of looking at the power relations within which we are enmeshed, 7 and can be 
summarised in three pertinent conceptual “steps”. First, a particular set of relations (be it 
legal education generally, or regimes of assessment, for example) must be thought of as 
forms of government – that is, as assemblages of practices through which problems are 
posed, solutions developed, and forms of personae are shaped. Second, this government 
must be understood as relying on particular forms of rationalisation and programming. 
Finally, government must be seen as a technological process, carried out through specific 
techniques and informed by practical bodies of knowledge. Each of these steps will be 
considered in more detail below.  
Legal education as government 
The first step – recognising that legal education and regimes of assessment within them 
constitute forms of government – is clearly necessary if one is to identify the power 
relations operating in specific contexts. Through pedagogical discourses, legal education and 
assessment practices are represented as relatively neutral activities, designed so as to allow 
students to engage in the learning process themselves. Here, education appears as a 
facilitative process, where the teacher rarely imposes upon students, but rather fosters their 
own development and learning. Largely, this does not appear as government because the 
roles of teacher and student are taken as appropriate and necessary. As such, the idea that 
education might be a form of governing seems the very anathema to this representation – it 
implies something negative. 
However, the sense in which government is used here draws heavily on Foucault's 
understanding of power as a productive social relation that circulates and produces 
knowledge, forms of order, and various personae, as opposed to a negative or repressive 
activity, undertaken by identifiable “ruling bodies”. It also relies on understanding the self as 
a continual construction, as opposed to a self-evident or pre-existing object. 8 Thus, 
government simply denotes the more or less directed attempt to “conduct the conduct” of 
persons and groups. 9 In this sense, the practice of legal education is clearly concerned with 
directing the conduct of students, staff, and administrators. 10 For example, law schools 
often seek to produce skilled graduates, ethical and socially just citizens, critically reflective 
learners, 11 or resilient and mentally healthy students. 12 Each requires a rearrangement of a 
specific assemblage of practices and knowledges, and shapes the personae of students and 
educators in different ways. New practices of teaching, assessment, training, accounting, 
and management come to be seen as necessary. Practical knowledges from various fields – 
social inclusion, political theory, mental health, and business management – are adopted, 
adapted, and applied to the daily activities of law schools. And various actors become the 
target of these practices and knowledges, as well as conduits for the implementation of 
forms of government. 13 As such, one effective way of reflecting on one's own role in 
directing the conduct of others is to consider legal education not as a disinterested process, 
but as only achieved through the piecemeal assemblage of knowledges and practices, and 
the successful enrolment of various personae. To more effectively draw out the way legal 
education operates as a form of government, one must highlight the process of thought or 
rationalisation behind it, as well as the technologies it mobilises to be achieved.  
Rationalising government 
The activity of governing always involves a certain degree of calculation and rationalisation – 
it is hardly ever an arbitrary or conspiratorial practice intended to further the interests of 
one group through repression, indoctrination, or other negative actions. Rationalities of 
government are those bodies of thought that are present within a particular field and allow 
a regime of practices to be made intelligible and understood, while also shaping the actions 
and arrangements of practices that appear necessary, inevitable, or desirable. 14 These 
rationalities express the targets and limitations of government, the justifications for 
government, and the appropriate forms of its exercise. An analysis of these rationalities 
highlights that we cannot “know” any phenomenon in a purely neutral way, and accepts 
that the “problems” or “objects” that we seek to act upon, and the ways of acting upon 
them that we understand as appropriate, can only be defined using the discourses and 
knowledges that are available to us at a particular time. Additionally, these rationalities are 
never directly implemented in practice, but are rather translated and operationalised in 
specific and practical ways into programmes of government in order to give effect to 
governmental ambitions. 15  
This focus on the rationalities and programmes of government draws from Foucault's work 
on the history of truth and the way that various discourses offer us historically contingent, 
yet apparently “truthful” representations of the world, on which we base our actions. 16 In 
this sense, analysing these rationalities allows one to reflect on the piecemeal and 
contingent ways in which we think about how to govern (i.e. through teaching and 
assessment), and what we are to govern (i.e. students as active learners). In addition, 
examining how these rationalities are translated and government is “programmed” is 
essential to highlighting the very real effects that rationalities of government have on 
shaping various regimes of practices, and one's own participation in these designs.  
The technological aspect of government 
Broadly speaking, these rationalities and programmes are concerned with the way that 
government is thought about and designed. However, government is also technological – it 
relies on specific techniques and practical bodies of knowledge to govern conduct. It is only 
to the extent that assemblages of these technologies have managed to remain stable and be 
taken for granted as conduits through which practices can be reformed that one can refer to 
any “governing authority” – including “legal education”. 17  
Foucault's examination of the numerous mundane techniques of disciplinary and 
governmental power that are exercised by diverse parties in any attempts to shape conduct 
are instructive in this analysis of practices of government. 18 Such practices can either act 
upon people, directing their conduct to some extent, or may be suggested to people as 
desirable techniques for governing their own actions and shaping their own self. 19 Analysing 
these techniques – such as forms of teaching, reflection, or assessment – brings to light the 
very precise manner in which conduct is governed, the ways that these practices link to 
broader rationalities of government, and one's own role in implementing these power 
relations.  
In light of Foucault's analyses of the interconnections between power and knowledge, one 
must also examine the practical bodies of knowledge used to inform the rationalisation, 
selection, design, and reform of the practices used. 20 Pedagogical discourses are exemplars 
of knowledges that provide such technical guidance about how to direct government. They 
provide significant advice about “how to teach”, or, as will be outlined below, how to design 
regimes of assessment to achieve specific ends. Even the construction of diagrams that 
clearly demonstrate typologies or hierarchies of learning, or the creation of rubrics of 
assessment criteria, 21 are technologies of government, as they calculate, inscribe, and 
represent the persons, practices, and relations that are to be governed. Analysing these 
technologies highlights the practical knowledges and representations that are often seen as 
neutral advice about how to best achieve a goal, and draws attention to the essential role 
they play as tools that allow for government to be undertaken.  
Notes on using this framework 
The primary purpose of this analytical framework is not to describe, but to critique practices 
of government, in a manner consistent with Foucault's investigations into truth, power, and 
the self. Thus, a few cautionary points must be made in this vein. 
First, this analytical framework does not seek to highlight that particular practices of 
government are necessarily good or bad – it cannot make moral evaluations about 
government, some of which often underpin theorising about pedagogical practices. 22 For 
example, it does not allow one to suggest open-book exams are inherently better than 
closed-book exams. It is simply concerned with identifying the power effects of each 
practice. This does not limit the potential for this framework to provide critique, but actually 
provides it with critical import – it details the act of governing without rallying against or 
excusing particular forms of government. Doing so can prevent legal educators from 
reforming legal education without regard for the power effects of their actions. It also 
means that some of the common narratives employed when talking or thinking about 
assessment and other practices of legal education – such as those positing the neutrality 
and inherent desirability of pedagogically-sound assessment practices over others – may 
need to be rethought, or at least suspended.  
Second, consistent with Foucault's suggestion that power is a widespread social relation, 
this framework must also be used to explore spaces where it is assumed that power is 
absent. For example, in advanced liberal (or neoliberal) societies where there is a conscious 
effort to minimise intrusive forms of government, people are governed “at a distance” 
through their very freedom. Citizens are encouraged to align their own ideals and 
aspirations to those of governing authorities, such as by becoming “enterprising” selves. 23 
Thus, when reflecting on legal education from the perspective of governmentality, it is 
essential that one think of apparent freedoms from power as part of the actual strategies of 
government. For example, reforms that seek to minimise negative or more passive forms of 
assessment and foster a student's active engagement (such as using open-book exams, or 
personal reflections to assess, as opposed to closed-book exams) cannot be understood as 
necessarily removed from power. Rather, they must be understood as exercising power in 
new ways.  
This government of freedom does not mean that law schools are always able to fully 
implement their intentions in practice, or that students are always successfully governed by 
law schools – one must avoid making such determinist claims about power and recognise 
the potential for resistance to these power relations. 24 Considering rationalities and 
technologies of government separately in this analysis ensures this, as it highlights that the 
intentions and designs of those seeking to shape conduct can be different from the actual 
effects of these practices when implemented. Despite the interrelation between discourse 
and practice, governmental intentions are not always directly implemented in practice.  
Governmentality and assessment practices: a case study 
The practices of assessment at three Australian universities – the University of Queensland 
(UQ), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), and Griffith University (GU) – will be 
examined here using this analytical framework. Analysing these universities, all located 
within Brisbane, Australia, allows assessment to be canvassed in some breadth, without 
sacrificing detail. Despite being drawn from the Australian context, this does not limit the 
relevance or applicability of this framework, nor the results of the analysis itself, to other 
contexts. As this discussion is focused on the discourses and practical designs surrounding 
assessment, it analyses the texts, policies, and administrative documents produced by these 
universities, through which regimes of assessment are rationalised and designed, and 
techniques chosen. 25  
As already highlighted, applying this framework to assessment practices in legal education 
problematises the assumption that regimes of assessment informed by pedagogical 
scholarship are neutral. It is this supposed neutrality and the quasi-scientific nature of 
pedagogical scholarship that lends pedagogically-sound assessment regimes their apparent 
desirability, and allows them to become taken for granted as appropriate ways of 
undertaking legal education. 26 While providing students with more positive learning 
environments and the freedom to personally develop into reflective, active, and lifelong 
learners may be desirable aims, it cannot be said that such interventions do not produce 
some costs. 27 However, when understood as a form of government (consistent with the 
first step in this framework), one can identify some potentially undesirable effects, including 
the reformulation of the terrain of government that pedagogically-sound regimes of 
assessment rely on, and the extension and intensification of governmental techniques upon 
which their implementation is based. 28  
Rationalising assessment 
Generally speaking, assessment practices used to be selected and designed by the lecturers 
of specific units simply to test whether a student knew the required content. However, the 
move towards implementing pedagogically-sound techniques has led to assessment 
practices increasingly being seen as regimes in their own right, requiring tailored designs 
and being more explicitly directed towards a range of specific ends. Pedagogical 
knowledges, as “truthful” discourses offering expertise about learning, have now become 
necessary passage points through which designs for assessment must pass. Additionally, 
these regimes are now often linked to the rationalities that underpin government in law 
schools, and are to achieve the broader ends of law schools and universities. 29  
In this sense, pedagogical discourses can be understood as a set of discourses underpinning 
the way assessment is rationalised as a form of government. While using assessment to 
shape forms of self is not unique to pedagogical rationalities of government, these 
discourses do reposition assessment practices as a central part of this process. For example, 
rationalities of government at UQ position assessment as a central part of teaching and 
learning. In particular, UQ states that assessment is central to developing, and making 
judgements about, student learning, as well as the quality of teaching. 30 Similarly, these 
rationalities are present at QUT, where assessment must be “designed to achieve the 
learning objectives of [a] unit”, 31 while at GU, assessment is part of “improving and 
promoting … learning”, examining the “teaching process”, and evaluating “the quality of the 
curriculum”. 32 Positioning assessment as such a central part of learning is clearly informed 
by pedagogical representations of students as “active learners” whose learning is most 
often driven by assessment. 33  
Notably, although these pedagogical rationalities represent students as “active learners” 
and thereby seek to shape students as students, they say nothing about the specific forms 
of legal personae that assessment regimes are to produce. However, other discourses do 
provide such rationalisations. For example, disciplinary rationalities clearly inform 
assessment regimes, seeking to directly shape legal personae through the exercise of 
disciplinary power. Foucault argues that the tool of disciplinary power par excellence is 
assessment (Foucault refers to “examinations” in particular). Through these techniques, 
people (or a skill or capacity that they possess) are presented to the hierarchical observation 
of power, and judged according to a normalising judgement. That person is thus created as a 
specific “case” that can be known, compared to others, categorised, and effectively 
normalised to such a point that they may progress to the next level of instruction or be 
rewarded for their successful achievement (with a certification, for example). 34 Each law 
school incorporates this disciplinary function into its rationalities – assessment is designed 
with the collection and production of knowledge about student achievement, and the 
determination of whether they are competent to proceed to another level of instruction, in 
mind. For example, the UQ policy on assessment states that assessment must be designed 
in concert with the “standards to be met”, and allow for “the award of grades”. 35 QUT also 
states that assessment ought to be used for the disciplinary practice of comparing students 
to others: “[t]he assessment in each unit [is to] be used by the lecturer to measure [the 
student's] performance in relation to other students”. 36 Finally, GU uses assessment to 
achieve the “formal … certif[ication of] achievements for external audiences”. 37 Clearly, 
assessment is used to produce forms of personae useful for external parties – whether 
skilled professionals for professional bodies and employers, 38 or socially just citizens 
accountable to “the wider community”. 39  
The use of assessment to produce specific forms of legal personae is not limited to these 
disciplinary rationalisations. Other vocational discourses within these rationalities construct 
the student's skills at analysis, communication, teamwork, research, and advocacy, as well 
as their ethical orientations and values, as appropriate targets for assessment practices to 
govern. 40 However, what becomes clear is that, overwhelmingly, assessment regimes are 
rationalised through pedagogical discourses that simply seek to ensure that the production 
of forms of legal personae can proceed in an effective manner. In this sense, pedagogically-
sound regimes of assessment are designed to facilitate the production of legal personae – 
either through the practices of law schools, or through the actions of law students 
themselves.  
So as to ensure that assessment practices can most effectively facilitate the production of 
legal personae, these broad rationalities of government are made practical and used to 
inform the design and programming of assessment regimes in numerous ways. In particular, 
assessment tasks are to be aligned, planned, and targeted to specific ends, and are to 
become continuous, both formative and summative, and criterion-referenced. Again, the 
design of these practices is based on the representation of students as active learners. 
Within these programmes, assessment is no longer a random assortment of practices, but 
rather precisely organised and directed to achieve explicit goals. Practices are to be chosen 
according to how effectively they can assess particular objectives – whether that is to 
develop a student's legal skills, or their ethical perspectives, among others. Such learning 
objectives are to be made explicit to students, so that they can use the piece of assessment 
to govern themselves in a desirable way. 41 They are also to be timetabled so that students 
can use feedback from previous assessment to benefit their completion of later assessment. 
42 These designs rely on the idea inherent within pedagogical discourses that students are 
active learners who gradually proceed from more directed instruction towards self-directed 
responsibility for their own learning. As the document underpinning this programming at 
UQ states, “the focus is on students accepting responsibility for their own learning … rather 
than being instructed explicitly”. 43  
This representation of students also suggests the use of both formative and summative 
forms of assessment, and the introduction of continuous assessment. Understood as a 
practice of government, the distinction between formative and summative assessment is 
somewhat collapsed, as both have a governmental effect on the construction of the student 
self. While only summative assessment contributes to a student's final mark, both are to be 
used to provide teachers and students feedback on their own progression in the unit, so 
that they can act on those comments and achieve a higher grade in other assessment tasks. 
This produces knowledge of a student's achievement that teachers can use to govern the 
student, and students can use to govern themselves. 44 Coupled with continuous 
assessment, these changes further entrench students within relations of government – 
continuous assessment provides more opportunities to gain knowledge about the 
achievement and progression of students, and potentially more opportunities for students 
to reflect on the way they are governing themselves. This form of government can only be 
successful to the extent that students are already active learners, though it continually 
seeks to produce them as such.  
One major component of the way assessment is programmed based on pedagogical 
rationalities is the requirement that law schools make explicit the standards that students 
are to achieve, and the criteria against which they will be assessed. 45 For example, the 
policy at GU states that 
[t]he requirements for learner success [are to] be made clear, and the overall strategy 
should be to develop in students the ability to evaluate the quality of their own work in 
order to equip them to function as professionals with a commitment to life-long learning. 46  
Again, this is based on the representation of students as active learners. It allows students 
to most effectively align their own self-government with the government exercised by the 
law school – the more detailed the criteria, the more effectively a student can construct 
themselves in concert with governmental practices. Through this programme, the 
conditions under which students are to govern themselves in line with the aims 
promulgated by law schools become apparent. 47  
Notwithstanding the disciplinary purpose of assessment, in the discursive space where 
government is rationalised and designed, assessment is primarily rationalised through 
pedagogical discourses, as these discourses are positioned as “true”. Law schools see 
assessment as a tool for achieving specific “learning outcomes” – as a set of practices that 
can be designed to facilitate the successful government of a range of different forms of legal 
personae. These pedagogical discourses clearly inform the way students are represented in 
the minds of governing authorities, and thereby delimit the appropriate methods through 
which to achieve government. Students are represented as active learners who have to be 
informed of the purposes of assessment, and the ways that a particular task is to work upon 
them. Regimes of assessment are also programmed on the basis of pedagogical 
representations of how learning occurs. These programmes are to provide a structured, 
progressive, and targeted approach to assessing students, ensuring that each element of 
these regimes offers students the opportunity to govern themselves as an active learner. As 
such, far from being disinterested, these rationalities and programmes allow for the 
achievement of specific modes of government. They actively shape forms of self – active 
learners – and suggest that the formation of this kind of self is an effective way of facilitating 
the achievement of a variety of other ends that law schools aim for, such as the production 
of specific kinds of legal personae. While assessment still remains a disciplinary practice, 
assessment regimes do not directly define the forms of legal personae that are to be 
shaped. However, they are to be able to facilitate the production of legal personae through 
government “at a distance” – by ensuring assessment is designed with specific goals in 
mind, that there are enough opportunities for students to receive feedback, and that the 
expectations and standards held by law schools are made clear. Although the professed 
justification for regimes of assessment may be based on pedagogical discourses, they 
operate in a governmental way to facilitate the achievement of various forms of 
government. 
Assessment as technology of government 
A wide range of technologies are used to give shape to these ambitions of government and 
operate to govern law students in specific ways. Many have long been used within legal 
education but are “reprogrammed” here on the basis of pedagogical discourses. This section 
will examine the ways that power is exercised through examinations, tutorial participation, 
practices of self-reflection, and the provision of feedback within these programmes so as to 
govern students. 48 In particular, it will highlight the unique ways in which the pedagogical 
discourses underpinning these programmes have reshaped and redesigned how these 
practices operate.  
The implementation of these governmental designs entails the reprogramming and 
redeployment of disciplinary techniques, such as examinations (to use a classic example). 
While the use of the end-of-year closed-book examination has declined in recent years amid 
criticisms that it was not pedagogically sound (it simply tested legal knowledge, led students 
to memorise content, and did not encourage them to reflect on or critique the law or 
actively engage in learning), 49 this has not meant that this technique has been abandoned. 
Instead, it has been redesigned and “reprogrammed”. 50 Many law schools now assess 
students by using more frequent open-book examinations, directed towards assessing their 
research skills as well as their knowledge or other “learning outcomes”. 51 In this sense, the 
exam is still used to discipline students to some extent, but can also be used to produce a 
wider range of legal personae than those that simply “know” the law (such as those able to 
undertake legal research).  
These programmes also rely on the implementation of techniques that extend forms of 
government. For example, some law schools assess a student's participation within tutorial 
classes. 52 This is often represented as a positive practice, allowing students to engage with 
the curriculum in different ways, to explore meanings and develop their own understanding 
(with limited guidance from the teacher), and to assess different skills. If nothing else, it 
means students are not beholden to an end-of-year exam as the only form of assessment. 
However, the increase in tutorial participation also brings with it the extension of 
government, wherein the gaze of the teacher is brought directly to the student, and is cast 
during every class upon everything the student does (as opposed to being cast at a handful 
of times through the year as it would have been with the exam). It observes the student's 
interaction with classmates, the answers they offer, the preparation they have undertaken, 
their completion of class activities, and their participation in teamwork. With the exercise of 
this gaze at such a micro level, and the knowledge that it produces being collated weekly, 
power relations are able to “know” the student more intimately. On this basis, teachers can 
intervene in very specific and immediate ways to shape and correct a student's 
understanding of content or achievement of skills. Thus, tutorial participation can be seen as 
a technique of government wherein power is intensified and students can more effectively 
be governed. 53 In particular, according to the “truths” offered by pedagogical discourses, 
they are given more guidance about how to effectively learn, thus being made into active 
learners in this process.  
Further, these programmes are implemented through the introduction of practices that 
encourage students to govern themselves through their own freedom and in line with the 
intentions of law schools. These techniques include practices of self-reflection and the 
provision of feedback. For example, producing self-reflective students, and assessing this 
capability, is a way of ensuring that students are able to evaluate their own achievement of 
particular goals, identify weaknesses in that achievement, and subsequently govern 
themselves to address those problems. Self-reflection is often undertaken through journals 
that allow students to contemplate a range of issues – such as their professional ethics, their 
learning processes, or their skills development. These reflective practices are also aided by 
the provision of feedback to students. Feedback is the point at which practices of 
government exercised by law schools most clearly extend to enrol students in their own 
government. Its provision is designed to show students how well they are or are not 
achieving particular aims, developing certain skills, or constructing specific personae, and is 
also intended to encourage them to use that information to make specific and targeted 
interventions in their own conduct. 54 However, despite the apparent freedom inherent to 
both self-reflection and feedback (i.e. students are apparently free to reflect however they 
like, and teachers are free to provide feedback however they like), this freedom is clearly 
governed in specific ways. Reflections are not random transcriptions of the student's 
feelings, but are to be constructed through the meticulous practice of extracting and 
recording the student's thoughts in line with the assessment criteria. Similarly, the feedback 
provided to students is to be constructed and offered in ritualised ways (such as by 
highlighting the successful and unsuccessful features of a student's work, suggesting how 
students might improve, and being provided in a specific timeframe) so that students can 
use it to govern themselves most successfully. 55 These practices are clearly utilised to 
produce active learners, as their success requires students to be actively engaged in their 
own self-government.  
It is clear that law schools rely on a range of practices to assess students, and students are 
encouraged to use these in specific ways to construct their legal personae. Though each of 
these techniques can be tailored towards producing explicit kinds of legal personae, it is 
clear that they are also designed to produce active learners (and even rely on students being 
so shaped) in order to allow other forms of government to be successful. Enrolling students 
in shaping themselves as active learners in this way allows for the production of a form of 
self that can be used by other relations of government to fashion legal personae “at a 
distance”. 56  
Conclusion 
This paper has presented a framework (underpinned by Foucault's work on 
governmentality) that offers legal educators new ways of reflecting on the power relations 
involved in legal education, and has applied this framework to assessment practices in three 
Australian law schools. It has shown that assessment practices are not neutral tools that can 
simply be used to understand student achievement, or contribute to the personal 
development of students by removing them from negative power relations. Rather, 
assessment is rationalised and programmed in specific ways to provide (according to 
pedagogical discourses operating as regimes of truth) the most effective conditions under 
which, and forms of self through which, the creation of legal personae can be achieved. 
Pedagogically-sound assessment practices are an intrinsic part of these regimes of 
government within legal education. They reformulate the terrain of government, extend 
power relations, and govern “at a distance” by facilitating the self-government of students 
and producing the forms of self that other governmental programmes can act through. 
Positioning assessment practices as a form of government in this way problematises the 
assumed neutrality and disinterested nature of pedagogical discourses. Further, it highlights 
that pedagogically-sound assessment practices are not inherently better or more 
appropriate practices, but simply a different arrangement of power relations. They do not 
remove students from power relations, but rather allow students to be more effectively 
known and governed by teachers, other students, and even themselves. These conclusions 
make it difficult to suggest what might be done differently in legal education – regardless of 
whether the assessment practices of legal education are underpinned by pedagogical 
discourses or not, reforms to these relations can only alter the modes of government 
through which legal personae are produced. 
Such an analysis allows for new forms of critical and ethical reflection on the part of legal 
educators, and new trajectories for this reflection. By further exploring legal education as a 
form of government, legal educators can analyse the potential effects and unintended 
consequences of mobilising pedagogically-sound practices in the service of other reforms to 
legal education. While, for legal educators, it may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that 
yearly closed-book exams actually involve fewer power relations than regimes of continual 
assessment aimed at specific targets, or that the “freedom” of students fostered by 
assessment that seeks to facilitate a student's own learning is itself a strategy for achieving 
government, it is this unique way of thinking about power relations that provides this 
framework its critical edge, and makes it such an essential reflective tool. 
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